Business email compromise case study
A fake fax, a stolen sign-in and a $30,000 invoice.
A staff member at a Gulf South organization signed in on a fake Microsoft 365 page, and an attacker used the stolen sign-in to read their email. The attacker resent a real vendor invoice from a look-alike domain with new payment instructions, and the organization paid about $30,000 by ACH. Wahaya IT contained the account and traced the attack. The money came back by luck.
Gulf South, about 125 staff
See the results- BeforeA new client, with MFA on but no sign-in monitoring yet
- What we didContained the account, preserved evidence and worked with breach counsel
- AfterA second factor for every payment change, and sign-in monitoring

The situation
Five steps from a fake fax to a $30,000 payment.
Each step the attacker took, and what would have stopped it.
The email
What the attacker did: Sent a fake notice from an online fax service the organization doesn’t use.
What would have stopped it: Training staff to question any notice from a service they don’t recognize.
The sign-in page
What the attacker did: Showed a copy of the Microsoft 365 sign-in page and stole the signed-in session, MFA included.
What would have stopped it: Phishing-resistant sign-in, such as passkeys or security keys.
The mailbox
What the attacker did: Read incoming and sent mail, deleted a real vendor invoice and emailed other vendors.
What would have stopped it: Sign-in monitoring that flags a stolen session.
The invoice
What the attacker did: Registered a domain that looked like the vendor’s, then resent the real invoice with new ACH instructions.
What would have stopped it: Reading the sender’s address character by character.
The payment
What the attacker did: The organization paid by ACH a vendor it had always paid by paper check.
What would have stopped it: A rule to confirm any payment change outside of email before paying.
MFA was on. The attack got around it by stealing the signed-in session.

Our response to the business email compromise.
Contain first, then find out exactly what happened.
Contain the account
Another vendor warned the organization, and the staff member reported it within hours. We cut off the account’s access and ended its sign-in sessions.
Preserve the evidence
We kept the sign-in and mailbox records before anything changed, so the investigation could show what the attacker did.
Investigate
We traced the stolen sign-in, the mail the attacker read and sent, and the invoice they deleted.
Work with counsel and the insurer
The organization opened a cyber insurance claim, and breach counsel led the investigation. Their findings matched ours.
The results
The payment came back by luck. Two fixes are now in place.
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The payment came back, by luck
The bank recall came too late. The fraudster had used the same bank account in other scams, and it was closed before the money arrived, so the ACH bounced back.
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No breach requiring notice
The investigation found nothing that had to be reported to customers or regulators.
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Findings matched, at a cost
Breach counsel reached the same conclusions we did. Their fees were substantial, which is what the cyber insurance claim was for.
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Multi-factor authentication for payments
A payment change is now confirmed on paper by postal mail and by a call to the vendor, and no ACH or wire goes out after a change without a wet signature.
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Sign-in monitoring for every client
It wasn’t part of our service when this happened. It is now standard for every client we manage, and this organization added more phishing training.
How to respond to a breach
Reported within hours, after another vendor warned the organization.
About $30,000.
Gulf South organization
About 125 staff.
New client
Before sign-in monitoring was part of our service.
Cybersecurity and compliance
Incident response, breach counsel support and a payment policy.
See which sign-in and mailbox records an investigation depends on.
What to take from it
MFA isn’t the finish line.
A fake sign-in page can pass your password and MFA code to the real Microsoft 365 page and keep the session it gets back. Phishing-resistant methods like passkeys and security keys don’t work on a fake page. Training helps, but this staff member had been trained. A written process catches what a busy person misses.
Payments and response
Never accept a payment change by email alone.
Confirm any new bank details, or a switch from check to ACH or wire, outside of email, using contact details you already have. The same rule stops payroll scams, where someone posing as an employee asks HR to change a direct deposit. If money goes out, call your bank, your insurer and counsel right away.
Why the payment went through
The invoice was real. Only the payment details weren’t.
The attacker didn’t write a fake invoice. They deleted the vendor’s real invoice from the mailbox, then sent the same invoice back from a look-alike domain with new ACH instructions. The vendor had always been paid by paper check, and a senior staff member approved the change and paid about $30,000. Payment changes were accepted by email with no confirmation, so nothing stood between the email and the payment. A second check outside of email would have stopped it.
The bank recall came too late.
The fraudster’s account was already closed.
If this sounds like you
Could one email change where your money goes?
We check your sign-ins
We look at your MFA, your sign-in monitoring and how a stolen session would be caught.
We check your payment process
We find where a payment change can go through on email alone, and you decide what to change.
Questions about business email compromise and invoice fraud
What is an example of business email compromise?
A real invoice that arrives with new payment details. In one case, a staff member signed in on a copy of the Microsoft 365 sign-in page. The attacker used the stolen sign-in to read their email, deleted a real vendor invoice and resent it from a look-alike domain with new ACH instructions. The organization paid about $30,000. Wahaya IT contained the account and traced what the attacker did.
Can MFA be bypassed?
Yes. A fake sign-in page can pass your password and MFA code to the real Microsoft 365 page and keep the session it gets back. Microsoft calls this an adversary-in-the-middle attack. Phishing-resistant methods like passkeys and security keys are built to stop it.
What is a look-alike domain?
A web address registered to look like a real one, such as a vendor’s domain with one letter changed. Email from it can pass every authentication check, because the attacker owns the domain. Read the sender’s address character by character on any message about payment.
What should we do if we paid a fraudulent invoice?
Call your bank right away and ask it to recall the payment, then call your IT provider, your cyber insurer and your attorney. Minutes matter. In one case the recall request came too late, and the money came back only because the fraudster’s account had already been closed.
Can you get your money back after ACH fraud?
Sometimes, but don’t plan on it. In one $30,000 case the bank recall came too late. The payment came back only because the fraudster had used the same bank account in other scams and it was closed before the money arrived, so the ACH bounced back. The reliable protection is to confirm any payment change outside of email before you pay.
How do we stop fake payment change requests?
Require a second factor for payments, just as you do for sign-ins. One organization hit by this fraud now confirms changes on paper by postal mail and by phone, and requires a wet signature on the first ACH or wire after any change. Use contact details you already have, never ones from the email. See our post on business email compromise.
Tell us how your payments get approved.
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15 minutes
Tell us how your staff sign in and who can change where payments go.
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We’ll tell you where one phishing email could get through.
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If we’re not the right fit, we’ll say so.







